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these ﬁ  ndings do not pinpoint the timing of   trustworthiness 
 judgments, given that judgments about 100-ms faces may be com-
pleted after faces disappear.
Obtaining neural measures of trustworthiness-relevant percep-
tual processing can more precisely deﬁ  ne the mechanisms by which 
judgments are made. In particular, neuropsychological and func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data have implicated 
the amygdala, which has been linked with threat detection (Phelps 
and LeDoux, 2005). Trustworthiness judgments were less system-
atic in patients with amygdala damage than in controls (Adolphs 
et al., 1998). Moreover, lower trustworthiness ratings correlated 
with higher amygdala activation in healthy individuals, even when 
they did not make explicit judgments during scanning, suggest-
ing that amygdala activation to untrustworthy faces is automatic 
(Winston et al., 2002). The idea that amygdala processing can sub-
serve threat assessment based on facial features, independently of 
cognitive analysis based on other information sources, also ﬁ  ts with 
evidence that amygdala activation correlated more highly with aver-
aged consensus trustworthiness ratings than with an individual’s 
own idiosyncratic judgments (Engell et al., 2007).
In contrast to these fMRI studies, other studies have enlisted 
the higher temporal resolution of electroencephalography for 
assaying the precise timing of relevant processes. For example, 
differences in event-related potentials (ERPs) have been reported 
in comparisons between emotional faces and neutral faces (Eimer 
and Holmes, 2007). These differences appeared in frontal scalp 
recordings beginning approximately 200 ms after face onset. We 
hypothesized that parallel effects might be found if consensus 
trustworthy (CT) faces were compared to consensus untrustwor-
thy (CU) faces.
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Decisions about whether to trust someone can be inﬂ  uenced by competing sources of 
information, such as analysis of facial features versus remembering speciﬁ  c information about 
the person. We hypothesized that such sources can differentially inﬂ  uence trustworthiness 
judgments depending on the circumstances in which judgments are made. In our experiments, 
subjects ﬁ  rst learned face-word associations. Stimuli were trustworthy and untrustworthy 
faces, selected on the basis of consensus judgments, and personality attributes that carried 
either the same valence (consistent with face) or the opposite valence (inconsistent with face). 
Subsequently, subjects rated the trustworthiness of each face. Both learned and perceptual 
information inﬂ  uenced ratings, but learned information was less inﬂ  uential under speeded than 
under non-speeded conditions. EEG data further revealed neural evidence of the processing 
of these two competing sources. Perceptual inﬂ  uences were apparent earlier than memory 
inﬂ  uences, substantiating the conclusion that time pressure can selectively disrupt memory 
retrieval relevant to trustworthiness attributions.
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INTRODUCTION
Upon making new acquaintances, individuals must decide how 
much trust to place in them. Given that harm can come from 
unwarranted trust in some social situations, an ability to make 
accurate trustworthiness judgments is beneﬁ  cial. There have been 
many investigations of the neurocognitive systems that process 
trustworthiness-relevant information from a single source, such as 
perceptual features or previous experience. In real-world situations, 
however, many sources of information are available simultaneously, 
and they are not necessarily congruent. For example, information 
from stereotypes based on physical features may conﬂ  ict with 
learned information about an individual. How are trustworthiness 
judgments made when multiple relevant sources of information 
tug in different directions? Moreover, do certain circumstances bias 
which sources can assert control over a judgment? We hypothesized 
that time pressure may be one critical factor that inﬂ  uences what 
can be brought to bear on trustworthiness and related judgments. 
For example, perceptual information may rapidly become available 
to guide judgments, whereas additional time may be required to 
retrieve relevant information.
Like judging a book by its cover, a person’s trustworthiness can 
be judged using facial information alone. Ratings of novel faces 
tend to be remarkably consistent across individuals (Engell et al., 
2007), although the exact nature of the relevant feature dimen-
sions is unclear. Some evidence suggests that facial expression may 
be particularly inﬂ  uential in trustworthiness judgments (Winston 
et al., 2002; Todorov, 2008; Oosterhof and Todorov, 2009). This per-
ceptual information processing appears to be quite rapid, because 
systematic trustworthiness judgments can be made after a ﬂ  eeting 
100-ms face presentation (Willis and Todorov, 2006). However, 
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Previously learned information can also inﬂ  uence trustworthi-
ness judgments, probably through a combination of conscious and 
nonconscious memory retrieval. In one study, positive or nega-
tive descriptions associated with faces impeded the later learning 
of new associations with the same faces when the new informa-
tion was inconsistent with the original information (Carlston and 
Skowronski, 1994). This effect occurred even when subjects could 
not explicitly recall the initial descriptions. Similarly, trustworthi-
ness judgments were affected by the valence of descriptions associ-
ated with faces, even in amnesic patients who could not recall the 
descriptions (Johnson et al., 1985).
Whereas both learned and perceptual information can inﬂ  u-
ence trustworthiness judgments, it is unclear how these sources of 
information interact to yield the ultimate behavioral decision. The 
current study provides new insight into the nature of these per-
ceptual and memory-based processes. In Experiment 1, behavioral 
evidence showed that the two sources were differentially sensitive 
to a response deadline, and ERPs in Experiment 2 provided further 
information about the timing of the two sources.
EXPERIMENT 1
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Twenty-four students participated for course credit (10 men and 
14 women; mean age = 19 years).
Materials
A total of 128 faces were classiﬁ  ed as either CT or CU based on 
ratings from a separate group of 35 subjects. Faces were paired 
with words selected from a list of eight positive and eight negative 
personality traits (Anderson, 1968), with speciﬁ  c face-word pair-
ings randomized across subjects.
Experimental procedures
Subjects completed eight blocks, each consisting of a training phase, 
a rating phase, and a recall phase. In the training phase, subjects 
saw 16 faces, each paired with a different word (four CT faces with 
positive traits, four CT faces with negative traits, four CU faces with 
positive traits, and four CU faces with negative traits). Subjects were 
instructed to remember each word-face pairing. At the beginning 
of the rating phase, subjects were advised whether ratings would be 
speeded or deliberate (four blocks each, pseudorandom order). For 
speeded ratings, subjects were required to produce a trustworthi-
ness rating within 1500 ms of face onset using a 5-point scale. For 
deliberative ratings, subjects were required to wait at least 3000 ms 
before responding (during which time a red X was visible above 
the face). In the recall phase, subjects were shown each face and 
given unlimited time to produce the associated word. Each block 
included a unique set of 16 faces and the same 16 words. Procedures 
were approved by the Northwestern University Institutional Review 
Board and all subjects gave informed consent.
RESULTS
Ratings were inﬂ  uenced by consensus face trustworthiness and by 
word valence as predicted (Figure 1). CT faces were rated as more 
trustworthy than CU faces by 0.65 points on the 5-point scale [main 
effect of consensus trustworthiness: F(1,23) = 20.5,  p < 0.001]. 
Faces previously paired with positive words were rated 1.57 points 
more trustworthy than those paired with negative words [main 
effect of word valence: F(1,23) = 96.4, p < 0.001] There was no 
interaction between consensus trustworthiness and word valence 
[F(1,23) < 1].
The type of rating phase, speeded or deliberative, had no over-
all inﬂ  uence on ratings [F(1,23) < 1]. However, the effect of word 
valence was greater in the deliberative condition than the speeded 
condition [1.80 points vs. 1.34 points, respectively, interaction of 
rating phase type and word valence: F(1,23) = 14.6, p = 0.001]. In 
contrast, the CT/CU effect was very similar across rating phase 
type [0.63 vs. 0.68 points, F(1,23) < 1]. Type of rating phase altered 
the word-valence inﬂ  uence reliably more than the consensus-face-
trustworthiness inﬂ  uence [t(23) = 2.9, p < 0.01].
Subjects tended to be inﬂ  uenced more either by facial trust-
worthiness or by word valence. That is, subjects who rated faces 
highly differently as a function of previously paired word valence 
tended to differentiate less between CT and CU faces (r = −0.59, 
p < 0.01). This negative correlation was more pronounced in the 
deliberative condition (r = −0.68, p < 0.001) than in the speeded 
condition (r = −0.32, p > 0.1).
In the speeded condition, reaction times were faster when consen-
sus trustworthiness and word valence were consistent (both positive 
or both negative, 1291 ms), than when the information conﬂ  icted 
across sources [1382 ms, t(23) = 2.9, p < 0.01]. Reaction times did 
not differ between consistent versus conﬂ  icting  information in the 
FIGURE 1 | Results from Experiment 1. (A) Behavioral judgments varied as a 
function of both consensus face rating and the valence of paired words. 
(B) The inﬂ  uence of word valence, as measured by the average difference in 
ratings between faces paired with positive versus negative words, was 
attenuated in the speed rating condition compared to the deliberative rating 
condition. In contrast, the inﬂ  uence of consensus face rating, as measured by 
the average difference in ratings between consensus trustworthy (CT) and 
consensus untrustworthy (CU) faces, was similar between conditions.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 16  |  3
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deliberative condition [3829 ms vs. 3871 ms, respectively, t(23) < 1, 
reaction times calculated from face onset].
DISCUSSION
Perceptual information relevant to trustworthiness judgments 
was apparently accessible sooner than information retrieved from 
memory. Memory for personality attributes that had earlier been 
associated with faces inﬂ  uenced trustworthiness ratings in the 
expected manner, but when subjects were forced to decide quickly, 
this inﬂ  uence was reduced compared to when there was ample 
time to decide.
An alternative explanation for these results is that speeded rat-
ings were more random than deliberative ratings. However, if the 
speeded condition simply encouraged random responding, then 
perceptual inﬂ  uences would also decline in this condition com-
pared to the deliberative condition. Yet, there was no evidence that 
perceptual inﬂ  uences on trustworthiness were disrupted in the 
speeded condition compared to the deliberative condition.
The slowing of responses when information from the two sources 
conﬂ  icted suggests that perceptual and memory-based processes 
compete in their inﬂ  uence on trustworthiness decisions. The nega-
tive correlation between the inﬂ  uence of previously learned infor-
mation and the inﬂ  uence of consensus facial information suggests 
further that competition exists between these two sources, and that 
individuals differ in the weights given to them in making trustwor-
thiness decisions.
Experiment 2 was designed to provide further information 
about the processing relevant for perceptual and memory-based 
inﬂ  uences. In particular, we sought converging evidence for the 
hypothesis that trustworthiness-relevant perceptual information 
is available sooner than information retrieved from memory.
EXPERIMENT 2
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Twenty-two individuals participated for monetary compensation 
(3 men and 19 women, mean age = 22 years). Data from ﬁ  ve of 
these subjects were not used because of equipment malfunction 
(one subject) or frequent blinking artifacts (four subjects). The 
pattern of behavioral results was similar regardless of whether these 
subjects were included.
Materials
Stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 1, except that 
there were 144 faces and they were classiﬁ  ed somewhat differently. 
Faces in the top 33% of consensus trustworthiness were classiﬁ  ed 
as CT, those in the middle 33% as consensus neutral (CN), and 
those in the bottom 33% as CU. On average, 49% of the CU faces, 
51% of the CN faces and 50% of the CT faces were paired with 
positive words.
Experimental procedures
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1. There were 
nine blocks, each with a training phase, a rating phase, and a recall 
phase, and EEG was recorded during the rating phase. Timing 
parameters in the rating phase were the same in each block; each 
face was displayed for 500 ms, and subjects could enter responses 
within 4000 ms from face onset. There was a ﬁ  xation period of 
1500 ms between the end of the rating period and the onset of 
the next face.
EEG was recorded continuously from tin electrodes at 59 loca-
tions covering the scalp. Four other channels monitored eye move-
ments and blinks, and trials with such artifacts were excluded in 
ERP analyses (average of 15% rejected per subject, SE = 0.02%). 
Reference electrodes were placed over the mastoid bones behind 
each ear. Recordings were referenced to right mastoid online and 
were re-referenced ofﬂ  ine to averaged mastoids. Impedance was 
brought below 5 kΩ and signals were ampliﬁ  ed with a band pass of 
0.05–200 Hz and a 1000-Hz sampling rate. ERP epochs were from 
100 ms before to 1000 ms after stimulus onset, and epochs were 
baseline-corrected by subtracting the average voltage of the 100-ms 
prestimulus interval from all data points in the epoch.
Analyses focused on EEG data from a cluster of frontal elec-
trodes and a cluster of central/parietal electrodes, based on previous 
research indicating that emotional expression inﬂ  uences frontal 
ERPs and that memory retrieval typically inﬂ  uences central and 
parietal ERPs. Data were analyzed by calculating mean amplitudes 
over 200-ms intervals beginning 200 ms post-stimulus, when the 
earliest effects were expected. Procedures were approved by the 
Northwestern University Institutional Review Board and all sub-
jects gave informed consent.
RESULTS
Behavioral results
As in Experiment 1, trustworthiness judgments were inﬂ  uenced by 
both word valence and consensus trustworthiness. Faces paired 
with positive words were rated 0.99 points higher than faces paired 
with negative words [F(1,16) = 18.8, p < 0.001]. Face type also 
inﬂ  uenced ratings, with CT faces given ratings 0.48 points higher 
than CN faces, which were in turn given ratings 0.29 points higher 
than CU faces [F(2,32) = 26.5, p < 0.001]. In addition, there was a 
signiﬁ  cant interaction of face trustworthiness and word valence, 
whereby word valence was increasingly inﬂ  uential as face trust-
worthiness increased [F(2,32) = 11.1, p < 0.01].
Again, subjects who made highly different ratings between CT 
and CU faces were less inﬂ  uenced by word valence (r = −0.48, 
p = 0.05). Subjects who were better able to recall at least the correct 
valence of word associates during the test phase also tended to be 
more inﬂ  uenced by word valence during the rating phase (r = 0.73, 
p < 0.001). There was also a correlation between the percentage of 
faces associated with the speciﬁ  c correct word during the test phase 
and the inﬂ  uence of word valence (r = 0.61, p < 0.05). In addition, 
negative words were more likely to be correctly remembered in the 
test phase than positive words [t(16) = 3.8, p < 0.01], but there was 
no effect of consensus face trustworthiness on memory for words 
[F(1,16) < 1].
EEG results
Faces of different consensus trustworthiness levels elicited ERPs 
that clearly diverged in the time period between 200 and 400 ms 
after stimulus onset, as shown in Figure 2A. These differences gave 
rise to a signiﬁ  cant main effect in the frontal cluster [F(2,32) = 4.2, 
p < 0.05], driven by a greater positivity for CT faces compared to 
CN faces [t(16) = 2.4, p < 0.05] and CU faces [t(16) = 2.6, p < 0.05]. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 16  |  4
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This divergence remained signiﬁ  cant at 400–600 ms [F(2,32) = 4.4, 
p < 0.05], again driven by a greater positivity for CT faces com-
pared to CN faces [t(16) = 2.6, p < 0.05] and CU faces [t(16) = 2.5, 
p < 0.05].
To assay correlates of memory-based processes, rating-phase 
trials were sorted as a function of memory performance in the test 
phase (Figure 2B). This memory performance was likely driven 
both by encoding in the initial test phase, and rehearsal during 
the rating phase. Regardless, because the words were not repeated 
during the rating phase, ERP correlates of test-phase memory per-
formance must reﬂ  ect processing of previously learned informa-
tion. In line with previous studies of ERP correlates of successful 
memory retrieval (Voss and Paller, 2008), ERPs from the parietal 
cluster were more positive at 400–600 ms when corresponding 
words were remembered compared to when they were forgotten 
[t(16) = 2.4, p < 0.05]. This difference continued in the interval 
from 600–800 ms [t(16) = 2.1, p = 0.05].
It is possible that the relatively early frontal ERP divergence 
between CT and CU faces was driven by subjects’ ultimate behav-
ioral ratings, rather than by perceptual features per se. In this case, 
one would expect to ﬁ  nd the same difference between ERPs to faces 
previously paired with positive versus negative words, as this manip-
ulation affected behavioral judgments even more strongly than per-
ceptual features. However, this comparison revealed no differences 
prior to 600 ms [t(16) < 1]. Instead, a later effect at 800–1000 ms was 
found (Figure 2C), in which parietal ERPs to faces shown previously 
with negative words were more positive than those to faces shown 
previously with positive words [t(16) = 2.1, p = 0.05]. Electrode 
clusters used for statistical analyses are displayed in Figure 2D.
DISCUSSION
Separate ERP correlates of trustworthiness-relevant perceptual 
and memory processes were identiﬁ  ed. As expected, signals of 
perceptual processing appeared sooner than signals of memory 
processing. In addition, ERPs associated with consensus ratings 
were not simply an indirect reﬂ  ection of behavioral judgments; 
the same ERPs were not found when comparing responses to faces 
previously paired with positive words to those paired with negative 
words even though paired-word valence had a strong inﬂ  uence on 
behavioral judgments.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 demonstrated that trustworthiness ratings were inﬂ  u-
enced by perceptual features and by memory retrieval, and that the 
inﬂ  uence of memory declined when people were forced to make 
ratings quickly. Converging results from Experiment 2 showed that 
neural correlates of perceptual information processing and memory 
retrieval relevant to trustworthiness can be measured separately, 
CT faces
CN faces
CU faces
200-400 ms 
CT vs. CN
CT vs. CU
Word later remembered
Word later forgotten
400-600 ms
Remembered vs.
forgotten
Paired with 
positive word
Paired with 
negative word
800-1000 ms 
 Negative word vs. 
positive word
2
–2
2
–2
1
–1
A BC
D
ms 0 1000
–6
0
6
12
FIGURE 2 | Results from Experiment 2. (A) ERPs to consensus trustworthy 
(CT) faces were more positive than those to both consensus neutral (CN) and 
consensus untrustworthy (CU) faces beginning at about 200 ms post-stimulus. 
ERPs are from the anterior frontal midline location (Fpz), shown as a large circle 
on topographic maps, which depict the distribution of amplitude differences on 
the head as viewed from above. (B) ERPs to faces differed as a function of 
whether the associated word was remembered, beginning at about 400 ms 
post-stimulus at central and parietal locations. ERPs are from the central 
midline location (Cz). (C) ERPs to faces differed as a function of previously 
paired word valence from about 800 ms post-stimulus. No differences were 
found in the frontal cluster. ERPs are from the anterior frontal midline and 
central midline locations (Fpz and Cz). (D) Frontal and central/parietal clusters 
used in statistical analyses are shown as large circles on schematic views of 
the head.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 16  |  5
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Johnson, M. K., Kim, J. K., and Risse, G. 
(1985). Do alcoholic Korsakoff’s 
syndrome patients acquire affective 
reactions? J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. 
Cogn. 11, 22–36.
Langlois, J. H., Kalakanis, L., 
Rubenstein, A. J., Larson, A., Hallam, 
M., and Smoot, M. (2000). Maxims 
or myths of beauty? A meta-analytic 
and theoretical review. Psychol. Bull. 
126, 390–423.
Liotti, M., Woldorff, M. G., Perez, R., 
and Mayberg, H. S. (2000). An ERP 
and that signals of perceptual processing appeared sooner than 
those of memory retrieval. Together, these results suggest that per-
ceptual information relevant to face trustworthiness is processed 
more quickly and can inﬂ  uence behavior sooner than memory-
based information.
Three relevant electrical signals were identiﬁ  ed: an early frontal 
correlate of consensus trustworthiness, a later correlate of memory 
retrieval with a parietal topography, and an even later correlate 
of word valence that also exhibited a parietal topography. The 
ﬁ  rst signal is likely to reﬂ  ect the analysis of facial expressions, as 
observed previously (e.g., Eimer and Holmes, 2007). Other results 
have shown that subtle facial expressions can drive trustworthi-
ness judgments (Winston et al., 2002; Todorov, 2008; Oosterhof 
and Todorov, 2009). ERPs may have been most positive for CT 
faces because of unambiguously happy expressions for these faces 
compared to neutral and untrustworthy faces. It is presently unclear 
whether consistent trustworthiness ratings generally arise from the 
gross categorization of facial expression or whether more subtle 
cues are operative. The ERP correlate of consensus trustworthiness 
found in the current study does not reﬂ  ect subjects’ behavioral 
ratings alone, and as such it displays a pattern similar to that of 
amygdala activation in fMRI studies (Engell et al., 2007).
The second ERP signal, a correlate of later memory retrieval, 
occurred with a latency and distribution paralleling effects found in 
other memory paradigms (Voss and Paller, 2008). This resemblance 
adds weight to the hypothesis that inﬂ  uences on trustworthiness 
judgments from conscious memory retrieval occur later than rel-
evant perceptual processes.
The late difference found in the comparison of ERPs to faces 
previously paired with positive versus negative words may reﬂ  ect 
better memory for negative words. Though it appears later than 
typical ERP correlates of conscious memory retrieval (Voss and 
Paller, 2008), the pattern of increased parietal positivity for faces 
previously paired with (better remembered) negative words ﬁ  ts 
with such an account.
The longer response times in the speeded condition when there 
was conﬂ  ict between perceptual features and learned information 
suggests that there is some integration of information from these 
two sources and that this integration may be more efﬁ  cient or 
straightforward when the information is consistent. The negative 
correlations between perceptual and memory-based inﬂ  uences 
suggest that individuals weight certain information sources more 
heavily at the expense of others, and that the pattern of source 
weights varies across people. Previous studies of the neural inte-
gration of conﬂ  icting information, with Stroop procedures (West 
and Alain, 1999; Liotti et al., 2000; Fruhholz et al., 2009) and face 
evaluation (Fruhholz et al., 2009; Schiller et al., 2009), relied only 
on perceptual information. The current study goes beyond these 
prior studies in showing that neural measures can be used to moni-
tor the separate processing of information from perceptual and 
memory-based sources.
The interplay of the neurocognitive processes investigated here 
is likely quite common in everyday life; when individuals make 
rapid judgments about others, even in the absence of a formal rat-
ing, they may be highly inﬂ  uenced by perceptual features and dis-
count memory-based sources of information. Stereotyping based 
on physical features may be a particularly salient example of this; 
individuals may have learned information contrary to stereotypes, 
but because of the time required to access this information, time 
pressure or cognitive load may often produce stereotype-based 
errors (Sherman et al., 1998; Correll et al., 2002). Initial personal 
judgments are quite persistent over time (Ambady and Rosenthal, 
1993). Such judgments can inﬂ  uence behavior not only in the 
context of artiﬁ  cial social interactions but also in real-world situ-
ations such as when one makes ﬁ  nancial decisions with input from 
professional consultants, chooses among multiple job applicants, 
or selects which political candidates to support (Langlois et al., 
2000; Todorov et al., 2005; van ’t Wout and Sanfey, 2008). Thus, 
understanding the nature of the perceptual and memory-based 
neurocognitive processes pertaining to trustworthiness has wide-
ranging implications.
The current results are consistent with evidence that perceived 
and remembered information inﬂ  uences trustworthiness judg-
ments through separate neural processes (Engell et  al., 2007; 
Todorov et al., 2007; Todorov and Olson, 2008). Our ﬁ  ndings fur-
ther provide behavioral and neural evidence that the perceptual 
processing precedes memory retrieval. Accordingly, information 
from perceptual analysis can inﬂ  uence trustworthiness assessments 
well before relevant information has been retrieved from memory. 
More generally, this conclusion may apply in the same way when 
information from perception and memory sources can be brought 
to bear in a variety of decision-making circumstances.
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